«« Ïðåä. | ÎÃËÀÂËÅÍÈÅ | Ñëåä. »»
4. Transparency Mechanisms
A review of the various laws governing the election of the president gives clear evidence of the efforts of lawmakers to ensure that the election process is open to public scrutiny. By attempting to establish mechanisms that promote transparency throughout the process, they have taken important steps in enhancing prospects for elections that are worthy of public confidence.
At a fundamental level, certain mechanisms for transparency are established in the Federal Law on Basic Guarantees and Electoral Rights of Citizens of the Russian Federation.
According to Article 8, the voter registry lists must be public disclosed at least 30 days prior to election day.
Article 13 retains the provisions related to the presence of deliberative (non-voting or consultative) members of election commissions that were established in 1993. Upon registration of a candidate or list of candidates (in the case of parliamentary elections), the nominating electoral association or the nominee proper is permitted to appoint one deliberative member to the registering election commission and all subordinate commissions. These members are entitled to get access to any materials or document of relevant election commissions, must be notified on a timely basis of all sessions of the commission, and be permitted to speak at those sessions. In an improvement to the presidential decree which governed parliamentary elections in 1993, deliberative members representing winning candidates or slates of candidates are permitted to retain their seats until the next election to the same body. The terms of those representing losing candidates or slated of candidates, expire 30 days after the election. In either instance, deliberative members are permitted access to commissions and election documents during the time frame in which election results must be announced and the likely period in which cases questioning the validity of election returns would be lodged.
Article 14 speaks to publicity of the activities of election commissions and requires that:
- the activities of election commissions are subject to publicity and openness;
- candidates and their authorized representatives, representatives of electoral associations and the mass media are entitled to attend sessions of relevant election commissions;
- decisions of election commissions must be published in the press or announced through electronic media within the time frame established by law;
- observers sent by public associations, electoral associations, candidates, and international observers have the right to be present at polling site election commissions from the commencement of the committees activities to the signing of the official protocol of returns.
With respect to voting returns, Article 31, stipulates that polling site election commissions are obliged, upon demand, to provide a certified copy of the official protocol of results to any observer. Article 32 provide for the same at the level of district election commissions. Inexplicably, no mention is made of territorial or subject level election commissions not just in terms of the right to receive certified copies of results, but even the role of these commissions in the determination of election returns. In Article 33, the law states that voting returns pertaining to each precinct, the outcome within each electoral district, and the corresponding data included in protocols or relevant election commissions and subordinate commissions must be made available for examination to any voter, candidate observer, or representative of the mass media.
Transparency Provisions in the Law on the Election of the President
The Federal Law on Election of the President of the Russian Federation builds upon the rights established in the Basic Guarantees Law. The Presidential Law, future elaborates the rights of deliberative members of election commissions, specifically requiring that deliberative members:
- must be informed of meetings of election commissions in advance;
- have the right to speak an election commission meetings, make suggestions on issues, and demand voting on them;
- have the right to ask other participants in the meeting questions and demand answers;
- are allowed access, for the purposes of familiarization, to any documents or materials of the respective election commission and its subordinate election commissions and receive certified copies thereof.
Article 20 is devoted to the publicity of activities of election commissions and also expands upon language of the Basic Guarantees law. Election commissions are obliged to conduct their activities publicly and openly. Candidates, their attorneys, authorized representatives of electoral associations -- as well as electoral blocs, initiative groups of voters -- and representatives of the mass media are entitled to be present at all sessions of election commissions.
As with the Basic Guarantees Law, decisions of election commissions must be published or announced in the mass media. Among the types of information which election commissions are required to disclose to the public are issues pertaining to candidate registration, background information on candidates, and election returns.
With respect to observers, this articles provides for observers designated by candidates, public associations, electoral associations -- as well as electoral blocs -- international associations, and media representatives. They are entitled to be present on election day from the beginning of the work of polling site election commissions to the completion of the official protocol of results. No mention is made at this point to access throughout election day and during the tabulation and aggregation of votes to access to territorial and subject level election commissions.
The articles continues: Observers are not required to give preliminary notification of their arrival at polling site election commissions. Again, building upon provisions of the Basic Guarantees Law, observers are entitled to:
- accompany the mobile ballot box to observe voting of the polling site premises;
- familiarize himself/herself with the list of voters;
- apply to polling site election commissions with suggestions or remarks;
- appeal actions or inactions of polling site election commissions to territorial election commissions.
Article 21 expressly guarantees the right of aggrieved parties to be present at sessions of election commissions during adjudication of complaints. Article 27 reiterates guarantees to make voter list publicly available for review not later than 30 days prior to the election.
One important innovation in the Presidential election law, which is consistent with a practice initiated under the Federal Law on Election of Deputies to the State Duma, is the introduction of a third copy of the official protocol of results specifically for the purpose of «familiarization» by candidate attorneys, observers, deliberative members, and media representatives. Articles 52 though 54 require provision of the third copy of the official protocol of results. At the territorial and subject levels, summary tables of results from subordinate commissions must be attached. Responsibility for the violation of electoral rights, including those of observers, is established in Article 61, which clearly states that any person preventing the legal activities of observers shall bear administrative and criminal liability.
CEC Instructions and Resolutions Regarding Observers
To reinforce the rights of observers and other entitled to access to election commissions and documents for the purposes of ensuring the transparency and accountability of the system, the CEC issued an explanation on these rights on 26 February 1996. Noteworthy departures from the two federal laws outlined above included in the CEC's regulations. They include the following.
- Candidate attorneys are expressly permitted to visit electoral precincts -- including those in military units -- during voting, vote counting, and determination of results.
- Deliberative members of election commissions are to participate in the work of internal «control groups» to monitor compliance with the law in such areas as conduct of the election campaign and use of the state automated system.
- Authorized representatives of candidates, electoral associations, electoral blocs, and initiative groups of voters are entitled to attend the verification of signature lists and other documents by the CEC.
Although the explanation acknowledges the right of observers to get access to protocols of relevant election commissions and received certified copies, language specifically permitting observers access to territorial and subject level election commissions on election day and during the aggregation of vote totals is absent (consistent with both federal laws).
However, a landmark resolution issued by the CEC on 12 April 1996 to encourage uniformity of vote tabulation and completion of official protocols of results at the precinct, territorial, and subject levels. Its provisions provided further reinforcement -- if not actual expansion -- of observers rights incorporated into the language of the document. Among its provisions were the following enhancements that served to strengthen the transparency mechanisms institutionalized by the election laws.
- In the premises where votes are counted (PSECs) and aggregated (TECs and SECs), and for display to the public, the CEC recommended that an enlarged copy of the protocol be posted into which data on vote returns would be marked.
- The CEC dictated that the official protocol be compiled in triplicate in the presence of . . . observers, candidate's representatives, and representatives of the mass media. This provision is applied not only to polling site election commissions, but -- for the first time -- territorial and subject election commissions.
- The regulation stated that the third copy of the protocol of results was to be provided for examination to candidates' representatives, observers, deliberative members of the election commission, representatives of the mass media, as well as any citizen of the Russian Federation upon his or her request. It also included a statement at failure to comply with this requirement entails a fine to be imposed upon the Chairman of the PSEC equivalent to 5 to 10 minimum monthly wages in compliance with Article 4013 of the Administrative Code. Again -- for the first time -- the presence of observers at the territorial and subject election commissions is specifically mentioned. At higher levels, summary tables was to be attached to the third protocol for review by observers. The regulation also indicated that fines for non-compliance would increase at each superior election commission.
- Upon oral or written request of any observer, the PSEC, TEC, and SEC is obliged to issue him or her a certified copy of the official protocol of results.
Beyond the law and the CEC's instructions and resolutions, training materials developed for polling site election commissions and territorial election commissions also address the rights of observers, candidate representatives, and the mass media. In its flip chart for poll workers, the rights of observers and authorized candidate representatives are outlined and guidelines are provided on how to handle observers who may be in violation of the law, for example advising voters on their choice, attempting to assist the commission in the administration of its duties, etc. The guidebook for territorial election commissions does reinforce the requirement that the third copy of the official protocol of results, along with the summary tables of results of PSECs be provided for examination to candidate representatives, observers, deliberative members, representatives of the mass media, and voters. It does not, however, deal with the provision of certified copies of the official protocol or (consistent with the above mentioned resolution) the rights of observers to be present during the aggregation of vote totals.
Attempts to Expand Public Control Over the Election Process
In mid-April 1996, a draft bill on public control over the election process and the openness and publicity of voter returns passed the State Duma in the third reading and was forwarded to the Federation Council for consideration. Although never enacted into law, its introduction and passage in the lower house of parliament ignited a highly politicized debate about the letter and intent of existing laws and the actual practice of transparency and accountability mechanisms.
The draft legislation focused on four main objectives:
- creation of opportunities for participation by «citizen» observers, in addition to those categories of observers already authorized under extant legislation;
- expansion of rights of all categories of observers to be present at PSECs, TECs, DECs (parliamentary elections only), and SECs on election day from the time of preparations for opening of the polls through the tabulation and aggregation of election results;
- creation of the means for verification of results through an automatic recount of ballots from a random selection of precincts determined by lot within each district or subject;
- provision of public access to data maintained on the state automated information system to users through public telecommunications networks on a «read only» basis.
At the time, the legislation's supporters attempted to foreclose on perceived opportunities for alterations or manipulations in the summarization and reporting of election results. The main emphasis of the bill appeared to be an attempt to provide a layering of oversight whereby partisan and non-partisan observers would be able to track individual vote totals from the precinct level through aggregation at TECs and SECs to the reporting of consolidated results for the federation as a whole.
Introduction of «Citizen» Observers
The proposed legislation represented an interesting approach to the commonly accepted practice, recognized in most western democracies, to allow neutral domestic monitors to observe balloting, counting, and aggregation of votes on election day. Typically, such observers are organized by non-partisan organizations and work under the umbrella of an entity which directs their activities, accumulates their findings, and formalizes and publishes their observations into a consolidated report.
An innovation of the proposed legislation was to place the emphasis on individual observers who would act independently. Under the draft bill, any citizen included in the voter registry of a particular polling station could become an observer by gathering signatures of 10 persons also included in the voter registry for that precinct. Upon presentation of the signature list to the PSEC chairman, and with no advance required, the citizen was to be accredited as an observer. As such, he would be entitled to remain present throughout election day including vote counting. Persons wishing to observe the aggregation process at superior level commissions could do so if they registered within the jurisdiction and collected signatures of 50 citizens also eligible to vote in that jurisdiction.
The intent of the draft bill was to add a layer of transparency beyond that which currently exists and to clarify the rights of non-partisan observers, whose rights under extant laws have been subject to varying legal interpretations. The draft bill places no restrictions on how may «citizen» observers can be at any one polling site, nor does it require advance notice.
The expectation that individuals would independently pursue options such as observing, submitting proposals or comments to PSEC chairmen, file complaints regarding alleged violations of the law, or appeal cases to higher commissions or a court may be unrealistic. Moreover, the implementation of such legislation in actual practice may not have ultimately achieved the desired ends. It is unlikely that, on an individual basis, such observers would have access to the kind of information or training that would contribute to effective and productive observation. Without guidance or coordination, «citizen» observers might not be familiar with their rights relative to the authorities nor legal restrictions placed on their activities, nor be equipped to evaluate the performance of officials accurately. This approach poses a scenario which could produce «anecdotal» observations with no means of identifying trends. It is the latter type of information which is considered most valuable in determining the degree to which election day processing, counting, and reporting of results was accurate, free, and fair.
For that very reason, in most democratic contexts, provisions for the participation of domestic, non-partisan observers rely on involvement of non-governmental organizations to fill this void. Working within such an organization, observers benefit from a coordinated effort. Through a more cohesive focus and systematic approach to the observation missions, there is a greater likelihood that their cumulative findings would be reported in a meaningful way. It is important to note that even if the findings do not reveal pervasive violations or purposeful manipulations, they can help officials and legislators made decisions about how laws or regulations need to be changes or where additional clarification, information, or training is required.
Expanding Rights of Observers
The draft bill also sought to address lingering questions and provide clarifying language concerning other categories of observers, whose range of rights was deemed unclear under the current electoral code. In particular, it attempted to expand rights of access by observers to superior level election commissions and election documents, voter lists, protocols of results, and summary tables. Although the bill was not adopted, virtually all of these issues were dealt with by the CEC in its resolution on «Uniform Procedure for Tabulation of Votes . . .» (detailed above), issued in the midst of the parliamentary debate on the public control bill.
The draft law stipulated that observers could be present from preparations for the opening of the polls through the completion of the official protocol of returns. They were also to specifically entitled to observe the conduct of voting via the mobile ballot box. Key language was also added the ensure «visibility of the ballots» which would allow observers «to see the contents of the ballots as they were being counted.» They was, likely, a response to some situations which arose during the parliamentary elections where observers were made to watch vote counting from outside a doorway, or in an area where their vision was restricted. Similar rights were also afforded to observers monitoring at the territorial commission level where summarization of results is accomplished. At this level they were also entitled to copy the information from the summary tables on which the cumulative data is recorded for the territory as a whole.
Violation of observers' rights was also addressed in the draft bill. One provision stated that infringement on or a rejection of the rights of observers by the election commission could result in invalidation of the election should such a finding be dictated by a higher commission or the court. This particular proposal raised questions about the relative rights of voters, candidates, and political entities, ie. that is theirs would be «lesser» rights as the violation thereof would not result in nullification of the election. The draft would also have required the Chairman of the relevant commission to «immediately consider» an observer's comments or proposals. Under the provisions of the draft another safeguard was proposed requiring that all entries in electoral documents and protocols regarding the results would only be recorded after they were announced aloud, and then, only in ink.
Provisions for Automatic Recount
The draft bill also attempts to build a systematic method of verifying the results reported from precincts through a mandatory recount of ballots based on a sampling of polling stations selected by lot. Under the proposed provisions, at least 4 precincts, but no less than 2 % of the total number of polling sites within each subject, were to be selected for an automatic recount. Recounts were to occur the day following elections. The law required relevant commissions to give advance notice of those who are eligible to be present at the proceedings. Candidates, their proxies, authorized representatives of electoral associations and blocs participating in the election, representatives of the mass media, and members of the district or subject commissions with deliberative and deciding votes were entitled to be present for the drawing of lots.
Verification of vote counts were to conducted by the polling site election commission in the presence of members of superior election commissions and observers who were present for the original count on election day. The protocol used for the reporting of the results of the recount were to contain the same categories of information entered on the original protocol.
This verification process could involve as many as 3 stages with progressively more polling stations subject to verification if discrepancies in the total votes reported were identified in even one precinct subject to recount and sufficient to change the range of the individual candidates on the ballot. If such a discrepancy was found among the initial precincts undergoing a recount, then further verification would have to be conducted in at least 5% of the precincts within the jurisdiction of that district (parliamentary elections only) or subject. If additional recounts were found to be necessary, they would have to be accomplished within 3 days of the decision. The subject electoral commission could ultimately call for recount of all precincts if the results of the first two stages exposed sufficient discrepancies to change the range of candidates.
While the concept of sample testing of the accuracy of reported results is commendable, the draft bill did not sufficiently take into consideration the means of implementing the legislation and facilitating compliance with all its requirements. For example, it was not clear how polling sites and all the observers and participants could be notified in time to actually be present if, indeed, the recounts were to occur on the day following the election. Also unclear was the location where the recounts would take place, although the implication was that they would be conducted at polling sites. The law did allow the recounts to be delayed if selected polling stations were in remote locations. If recounts were to occur at the polling site, no consideration was given to how members of superior election commissions could disburse themselves to be present at several locations simultaneously and at a time when aggregation and reporting of results was taking place at TECs, DECs, and SECs. It does not seem likely that the recounts could occur at the subject headquarters under the anticipated time frame either. Under the Law on the Election of President, ballots and materials do not need to be forwarded to the headquarters until up to 10 days following the election. No provisions addressed the issue as to how ballots and supporting documents would be safeguarded in the interim.
The draft bill was also silent as to how the recounts are to be addressed in the final reporting of results. There was no language to the effect that the recounted results would be considered as the official results to be identified in the consolidated summary of returns. Also left unanswered: How could the Central Election Commission summarize federation-wide results by the 15th day after the election if recounts resulted in delays in reporting by subjects. According to Article 55 of the Law on the Election of the President, the Central Election Commission is required to publish the final results not later than 18 days after the election. Under Article 40 of the Code on Administrative Offenses, officials are held accountable for failure to submit or publish information concerning the election results on time.
Access to the State Automated System
The draft bill also attempted to provide users of public information telecommunications networks to access all data on the CEC's State Automated System via modem. Access was to be on a «read only» basis. If such a system were to be instituted, the CEC would need time to prepare an advance campaign which not only describes the services, but also presents information geared to promote reasonable expectations among users. In particular, a public information campaign would include a description of the time frame in which data will be forthcoming with an explanation of normal delays which should be anticipated. There should also be an effort to develop a public information campaign to forestall suspicion or distrust which could result if technical shortcomings or data entry errors results in adjustments or other changes in the entries comprising the overall summary of results.
Election System Performance
Observers
In general, the presidential election and second round voting demonstrated continued improvements in the practice of election observation both in terms of facilitation by election authorities and the levels preparation and scope of activities of observers, themselves. The presidential elections also exhibited increased diversification of political and public interests represented. At the same time, discrepancies did emerge in certain localities regarding the handling of observers and their requests at various levels and from site to site. This can also be said of the relative coverage by and effectiveness and engagement of observers.
IFES team members noted a significant increase in the number of observers present at urban and suburban sites compared with the parliamentary elections just six months earlier, although coverage in rural areas remained sporadic. Due to the significant number of political parties participating in the parliamentary elections, it was theoretically possible for polling sites to have in excess of 100 persons observing the process. Instead many had none at all. With the exception of the KPRF, most electoral associations were unable to mount comprehensive grass-roots monitoring efforts in December, although certain regions exhibited broader monitoring efforts based on relatively developed political structures. Even when present, observer actions were, at times, questionable. At that time, some partisan observers assumed responsibilities reserved for election administrators such as assisting in the validation and counting of ballots.
For the presidential elections, Communist Party (KPRF) and Zyuganov were the most consistently represented, not only throughout Russia but also in overseas voting sites. They also appeared to be the best organized and prepared. Coordinators were recruited to direct and support KPRF observer activities. In areas where IFES team members were present, KPRF observers were found to be extremely diligent in their duties, a few to the point of overstepping their mandate. Specialized training manuals were developed for KPRF observers and deliberative members at polling site election commissions as well as at territorial election commissions. These materials clearly outlined observer tasks; offered helpful hints to boost effectiveness; contained coordinator contact information; elaborated legal rights and restrictions of observers; provided a check-list of what observers should do at each stage of the process on election day; highlighted possibilities for violations such as political propaganda in polling sites, vote buying, and abuse of absentee and portable box voting. These guidelines also instructed observers how to fight violations of the law. The final reminder to observers: «Remember! The law is on your side. Violations of the law may result in administrative and criminal penalties.» KPRF observers also came to the polls equipped with copies of the protocol form to fill in and have certified once PSECs completed their official protocol of results.
Yeltsin observers were also prevalent and tended to include supporters as well as a great many representatives of administrative authorities. The use of the latter tended, however, to confuse their official role (supposedly a non-partisan one) with that of observer and may have had a symbolic impact, if not influence, on voters and election officials. Authorities serving as observers were rather passive in their observations, but were well briefed in the specifics of the law. Other Yeltsin observers, whether political activists or everyday supporters, tended to have a less clear understanding of their function and a proactive posture, although this varied from site to site. One Yeltsin observer in Moscow, who had been provided with instructional materials and attended three separate training sessions, did not understand what she was to do with the certified copy of the official protocol of results which she had requested of and received from a polling site election commission chairman. When she asked the chairman what to do with it, he suggested that she return it to the candidate organization which asked her to observe.
Observers representing Yavlinsky and Lebed were also commonplace with Byrnsolov and Zhirinovsky representatives frequently visible. Yavlinsky observers were provided with written instructions and did received some preparatory training. IFES team members did not encounter many observers representing other candidates, but did notice an increase in the number of persons representing public associations at polling sites. In addition, partisan observers representing political entities not running candidates in the presidential race, such as the Agrarian Party, were also present. Similarly, persons observing on behalf of candidates eliminated in the first round of voting appeared to monitor the integrity of the process during repeat voting on 3 July 1996.
Informal inquiries of observers on election day by IFES team members revealed general satisfaction with the conduct of the election. Only minor infractions, such as open voting, ie. failure to utilize secrecy booths, were noted. In a few instances, however, IFES team members did encounter observers who had been informed by polling site election commission chairman that they would not receive certified copies of the official protocol of results until vote totals had been reviewed for mathematical accuracy and accepted by territorial election commissions. By and large, however, IFES found election commission chairmen to be much more familiar with the rights of observers and, specifically, the third copy of the official protocol of results and provision of certified copies of results. Interaction between domestic observers, election commission members, and international observers appeared to be cordial and constructive in most, but not all cases.
It was interesting to note different strategies once polling site vote totals had been determined. Yeltsin observers consistently followed the official protocol of results to territorial election commissions where they were reviewed by TEC officials for mathematical errors or technical errors in the completion of the protocol form, particularly the ballot accountability section, and the input of data into the SAS system. KPRF observers, on the other hand, proceeded to party headquarters to turn in their certified copies of the official protocol to their assigned coordinator who subsequently compared each certified copy with official protocols of (aggregate) results and summary tables at superior level election commissions. With the exception of some YABLOCO representatives, virtually none of the other partisan or public observers proceeded to the TECs on election night.
While the KPRF approach failed to provide further control at the TEC level during the review of PSEC protocols and data entry into the SAS on election night, it was the most successful in tracking aggregate totals and collecting and forwarding documents and information up through the party hierarchy. KPRF representatives in Moscow consolidated this information, creating tables which listed alleged violations by region, the entities to which formal complaints were forwarded, and the status of each case. Such a document is an important record of election day observations, a testament to the KPRF observer effort, and a tool in identifying trends of mistakes or malfeasance. No other political entity provided such a formal or comprehensive report of findings, offering only verbal anecdotes instead. It should be noted, however, that such information -- especially when formalized -- does not appear to be considered «public information» by partisan observer entities and is extremely difficult to obtain. At this stage it would appear that observer finding are being used largely in the adjudication of grievances process and for the purposes of political propaganda rather than for public edification.
It should also be noted that based on the information IFES was able to obtain, observers did succeed in exposing election day errors, improprieties, and, in some cases, localized manipulation of results such as the influence of local administrations. Other complaints, however, illustrate the need for continuing education and training of observers to better familiarize them with election law and administrative regulations. Post-election interviews with select observer coordinators and deliberative voting members by IFES did reveal that despite criticisms of the process, the outcome of the election was accepted as reflecting the will of the Russian people.
Deliberative Members of Election Commissions
Despite significantly improved coverage by observers on election day, the participation of deliberative members at all levels was sporadic and random below the Central Election Commission. At that level, deliberative members reported that they were able to work together to lobby the CEC for expanded access and privileges. Although some deliberative members of the CEC complained that they were being denied access or were excluded from various control mechanisms, further inquiries by IFES revealed that these allegations were more political than substantive.
Although deliberative members representing incumbent President Yeltsin and candidate Zyuganov were most visible at lower level commissions, claims by Yeltsin's campaign organization and the KPRF that they would have near universal coverage of deliberative members were, clearly, exaggerated. Yavlinsky succeeded in appointing deliberative members to each of the 89 Subject Election Commissions, but had virtually no representation at the TEC and PSEC levels. Beyond these three candidates, deliberative member representation dropped off considerably.
Although deliberative members representing losing candidates retained their seats for 30 days after the official announcement of results (first round), which would have provided them with continued input and control during repeat voting, most opted to discontinue their duties prematurely. In this area of election system performance, is clear that candidate organizations failed to exercise -- much less optimize -- their rights of access, input, and oversight. This is particularly disturbing given the fact that deliberative membership on election commissions, although expanded in the new election legislation, has been a prerogative of candidates and electoral associations since 1993. Given that deliberative members have all the rights of election observers plus more, strategies concerning use of human resources by candidate organizations should be considered. Finally, Election commissions also have a responsibility to provide better information to candidates and their authorized representatives on the role, rights, and responsibilities of deliberative members.
For Consideration
6.1. Article 14 of the Basic Guarantees Law on Electoral Rights and Article 20 of the Federal Law on Election of the President of the Russian Federation should be amended to specifically allow access by all categories of observers to Territorial and Subject Election Commissions on election day through the official announcement of results. This would resolve continued confusion about rights of observers at superior level commissions and would facilitate the realization of Articles 53 and 54 regarding access to the third copy of the official protocol of results. To further improve upon access, Articles 53 and 54 should be revised to require posting of the third protocol and summary tables at SEC and TEC sites to accommodate «familiarization» and should specifically stipulate that certified copies of the third protocol are to be provided upon request. These issues are currently being addressed by the CEC through it regulations and instructions, but must be incorporated into the law.
6.2. The use of local administrators as observers on behalf of incumbent President Boris Yeltsin blurred any distinction of their function at the polling site. It is unrealistic to presume that the presence of local administrators went unnoticed by voters or polling site workers, whose actions may have been influenced as a result. In some cases, local administrators were not merely «present» in the capacity of observers, but actively directed the work of commissions. In the future, revisions to the federal election code and CEC administrative regulations should make exclusive the roles of local administrators with supplemental responsibilities to election commissions in the conduct of elections and partisan observers of the election process.
6.3. To facilitate the work of observers on election day, polling site election commissions should be provided with hand-outs to distribute among observers. Such a hand-out should clearly stipulate the rights and responsibilities of observers and outline activities forbidden under the law, as well as provide contact information for the precinct and superior level election commissions. The hand-out itself, should be presented in a «user friendly» format and viewed by election commissioners as a «layman's tool» which compliments the «legalize» of the electoral code and administrative regulations. By preparing and distributing such materials, election commissions can facilitate, in a positive and pro-active manner, the work of observers and their understanding of and compliance with legal and regulatory requirements, while reinforcing the notion that poll workers and observers share the goal of ensuring the integrity of the election process.
6.4. Significantly more emphasis must be placed on the provision of training for election administrators in «special» polling site election commissions, such as hospitals, prisons, consulates, and military installations regarding the legal rights of observers to be present and receive information.
6.5. In many polling sites, poll watchers are seated in a special area created for and marked «observers.» Often, seats are placed behind a table which may or not be located near the ballot boxes or, at the end of the day, the area where ballots are being counted. Depending upon the polling site election commission chairman, poll watchers may be restricted in their movement beyond the «assigned» area. In the future, polling site election commissions might consider providing identification badges or stickers to poll watchers. This would allow them freedom of movement around the polling site, while at the same time clearly identifying them as «poll watchers» to voters and others present at the polling site. The partisan affiliation of each observer need not be made public. To ensure that the badge not become a form of political propaganda, it should be provided by the polling site election commission when the poll watcher signs in with the chairman the morning of the election.
6.6. Despite significantly improved directives from the Central Election Commission concerning the provision of certified copies of the official protocol of results (see the Resolution on Uniform Procedures for Counting and Tabulation of Votes . . . ), it is clear that supplementary instruction and training is required to bring all polling site election commissions into compliance with the letter, as well as the intent, of the electoral code and administrative regulations. In particular, polling site election commission chairmen must understand that certified copies of the official protocol of results must be provided at the time of request, ie. once the vote totals for the precinct have been calculated by the members of the polling site election commission and the official protocols completed in triplicate. In particular, provision of certified copies is not to be delayed until the precinct's protocol has been reviewed and accepted by the appropriate Territorial Election Commission. If mistakes are found in the official protocol and the PSEC is required to prepare a new official protocol, the onus is placed on the Polling site election commission chairman to contact observers and inform them that corrections were required by the TEC. A certified copy of the new official protocol must then be offered to observers. In the future, administrative regulations should deal with the timing of provision of certified copies of the official protocol of results and flip-guides or instruction booklets targeted at PSECs should directly address and disallow the temptation to deny provision of certified copies of results until TECs have accepted them.
6.7. Polling site election commission Chairmen must also be counseled on the importance of certified copies of the official protocol of results, particularly the fact that it is admissible as evidence in a court of law. The practice of pre-certifying blank protocol forms for observers watchers to fill in once vote totals are known or of certifying copies without reviewing their accuracy must be eliminated despite its time-saving value. Posting the third copy of the official protocol or announcing the results allows observers to prepare their own copies, which then must be thoroughly reviewed for accuracy by poll workers prior to certification. Discrepancies between the official protocol of results and certified copies, even if returns are valid, can lead to investigation, litigation, and a public perception of impropriety.
6.8. CEC administrative regulations should expressly allow observer access to SAS data processing centers and should make mandatory the informal practice of some such centers, provision -- upon request -- of a computer print-out based on official protocol of the PSEC to observers.
6.9. With regard to TECs, Article 18 of the Federal Law on Election of the President of the Russian Federation, should be amended to stipulate that the term of powers shall expire 10 days after the official publication of results rather than with the official publication of the results (according to Article 55 must be done within 3 days of the signing of the official protocol of results by the CEC). Under current practice, PSECs appear to be forwarding all election documents to TECs on election night or the immediate aftermath of the election and, once TECs have forwarded official protocols to superior election commissions, they close their doors, whether their term has expired or not. An extension of two weeks during which TECs must continue to be publicly accessible and responsible to service requests and inquiries of voters, observers, candidate representatives and attorneys, and the mass media, would better fulfill the letter and intent of the Presidential election law and CEC regulations with regard to transparency. The closure of TECs in the days immediately following the election, supposedly having fulfilled their duties, significantly obstructed attempts by observers and the mass media to «track» protocols of results up the election commission hierarchy, ie. compare the consistency of certified copies of protocols from PSECs with the summary tables attached to the official protocol of results prepared by the TECs, obtain certified copies of TEC level protocols, or to receive an explanation about corrections that may have been required at the precinct level.
6.10. In the future, some consideration might given to adopting a practice whereby deliberative voting members and domestic observers also sign the official protocol of results prepared by the respective election commission or attach a dissenting opinion at the time the vote totals or aggregates are determined. This practice can further enhance public confidence in returns or immediately expose perceived or real problems to higher level commissions. It requires that observers publicly disclose their assessment of the integrity of results at that time and at the particular commission observed. It does not preclude challenges at some future point, especially if discrepancies are found between subordinate and superior commission reporting, but may discourage late or insubstantive challenges to results based more on political strategies than the actual conduct of election officials.
6.11. Election commissions need also provide improved information to candidate organizations, electoral associations, and blocs, on the purpose, role, and rights of deliberative voting members and how these differ from election observers. For their part, political entities -- which it is acknowledged have limited human resources -- should develop better strategies for use of those resources. In particular, deliberative voting members in addition to being allowed to observe the polls on election day, also have significant rights of access to commissions, information, and election documents during the campaign period and after election day. That is to say, deliberative voting members have all the rights of observers plus more. Nonetheless, most political entities used their limited human resources in the observer capacity rather than the deliberative voting member capacity and, as such, did not take full advantage of rights of input, access, and oversight provided for in the law and administrative regulations.
6.12. During the course of the presidential election campaign, a number of proposals were introduced concerning the expansion of transparency mechanisms, most notably the draft «Federal Law on Public Control Over Elections and on the Openness and Publicity of Vote Returns.» None of these was, ultimately, enacted into law. Should policy makers determine that significant adjustments are necessary to the system of transparency and accountability which has been developed to date, these should be put forth in the current debate on reform of federal election legislation with greater attention to technical, administrative, and resource considerations, rather than initiated in the midst of politicking during the election campaign.
«« Ïðåä. | ÎÃËÀÂËÅÍÈÅ | Ñëåä. »»
|
