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Introduction. Some objectives for reform of regulations relating to political financing in Russia
This paper will address some of the main questions raised during the roundtable conference organised by the International Foundation for Election Systems and the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation at the Aerostar Hotel, Moscow on 18 December 1997. The title of the roundtable was Campaign Finance Disclosure and Enforcement: Russian and Comparative Perspectives. It also discusses questions raised at additional meetings with staff members of the Central Election Commission on 17 and 19 December 1997.
The following five core issues were discussed at these meetings:
1. BROADCASTING
 What are the methods used in other countries to regulate political output on the broadcast media?
In particular, how are privately-owned television and radio stations regulated?
Apart from rules concerning political broadcasts by candidates and electoral associations, is it possible to regulate news broadcasts and other programmes to ensure that they are free from partisan bias?
2. PUBLIC FINANCING OF CANDIDATES AND ELECTORAL ASSOCIATIONS
What formulae are used in other countries to allocate public funds to competing candidates and parties?
What are the practical implications of alternative formulae?
Does `fairness' mean that every party or electoral association must be given an equal share regardless of its size, political significance and past electoral performance?
3. FINANCIAL DEPOSITS
Is a system of financial deposits for candidates at parliamentary elections (such as that in Britain) a reasonable and effective way of discouraging `trivial' candidates?
4. THE DOCTRINE OF AGENCY
Does this legal device, used in Britain, Canada and elsewhere, make it easier to control unauthorised campaign expenditures?
Precisely how do the rules relating to `agency' operate?
5. ENFORCEMENT AND PENALTIES
In practice, are serious penalties for contraventions of laws regulating the financing of political campaigns ever imposed in other countries ? Or are the penalties merely theoretical ?
Are there any suitable intermediate penalties between what might be viewed as the extremes of, on the one hand, small fines and, on the other hand, of substantial prison sentences ?
The first four of these topics are considered in this paper, the fifth will be the subject of a separate paper prepared by Robert Dahl.
Though the above questions will be considered separately, they reflect two main concerns that were repeatedly expressed. These underlying problems may be summed up as (a) too many competing candidates and electoral associations in Russia and (b) poor enforcement of regulations relating to political financing.
The emergence of a confusingly large number of competing political organisations is characteristic of systems where competitive elections have a relatively short history. The fact that the number of electoral associations is now seen as an issue for regulators is, in my view, a healthy sign that Russia is moving to a new stage of democratic development.
Why does a large number of electoral associations pose a problem? The existence of 43 electoral associations, as in 1995, is a problem because, quite simply, it makes it very hard for voters to make an informed, well-considered choice since they are faced with a confusingly large number of alternatives. In William Shakespeare's play The Merchant of Venice , the heroine, Portia, had to make a choice between three different suitors. Imagine what the play would have been like if Shakespeare had been obliged to base the plot on the Russian elections of 1995. Portia would have had not three suitors (or `electoral associations') but 43. The rules would have forced the Bard to give equal time in his play to every claimant for the princess's hand in marriage. The audience would have fallen asleep from boredom and confusion.
Assuming that there are too many competitors for electoral office in Russia, is it possible and is it desirable to introduce regulations designed to reduce the number of candidates and the number of electoral associations or parties?
First, it is well known by political scientists that each country's electoral system tends to affect the number of parties. (a) Majoritarian systems (such as those of the United States, Britain, and Canada) usually produce fewer political parties, while systems of proportional representation usually lead to greater numbers of parties. (b) Within systems of proportional representation, the number of parties may be reduced by rules which prevent small parties which fail to obtain a minimum threshold of the national vote from winning any seats in the legislature. This device to limit the number of parties within a proportional system is associated with postwar Germany and, of course, exists in Russia too.
Second, apart from rules relating to the electoral system, the number of political parties and the number of candidates may also be affected by regulations concerning the funding of elections. At one extreme, it is possible to impose financial restrictions on would-be candidates. These are considered in Section Three below. In Japan, each candidate is required to make a financial deposit of no less than ¥ 2 million (about US$16,000).
By contrast, systems encourage the proliferation of parties or electoral associations if they provide equal shares of free broadcasting time and public subsidies to all of them regardless of their size and their past electoral performance.
Although it seems sensible to consider institutional reforms - including those concerning political financing - that are likely to discourage the multiplication of electoral forces, it is nevertheless a matter of judgement how far the rules should penalise small parties. Countries where the rules strongly discourage the emergence of new political parties (as in the United States) are as open to criticism as those (such as Russia) where there arguably exists a confusion of electoral actors.
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