«« Пред. | ОГЛАВЛЕНИЕ | След. »»
Section Three. The use of financial deposits as a method to regulate the number of candidates
It is beyond question that democracies should encourage citizens to put themselves forward as candidates for election to public office. Yet, it may be necessary to introduce measures to deter some who wish to abuse the system of voting. This can be illustrated by several real examples.
First, some people may wish to put their names forward as a joke. In Britain, candidates have regularly been nominated by `The Monster Raving Loony Party.' One of the most constant of fringe candidates has been a former pop-musician called `Screaming Lord Sutch'. Since all candidates in a British parliamentary election are entitled to appear before the television cameras when the election result is announced, and since every candidate's name must (by law) be mentioned whenever there is a report on television or radio about the election campaign in the constituency, joke candidates gain publicity. In Poland, a Beer Drinkers' Party was created and, in fact, gained a considerable number of votes. Russia, too, has had its Beer Lovers' Party.
Second, groups with extreme political opinions may present candidates who have no hope of winning but who ensure that their party has the entitlement to a free party political broadcast that is given in Britain to any party with at least fifty candidates. Since the election deposit is £500 per candidate, the cost of fifty deposits (£25,000) gives a `party' the right to broadcast its views - a marvelous opportunity for groups which, for example, wish to present a piece of racialist propaganda at a bargain cost.
Third, the fact that individuals in Britain are permitted by law to change their names permits another form of `joke' candidature. Someone may change his name so that it is exactly the same (or almost exactly the same) as that of a famous politician. The joke candidate may then stand for election in the same constituency as the famous politician. The voter will then find it hard to distinguish between the real Mikhail Gorbachev and the one (or several) `fake' Gorbachevs. This has happened in Britain, the United States and, probably, elsewhere.
Fourth, it was a few years ago possible in Britain for soldiers wishing to leave the armed forces to abuse a loophole in military regulations. Since it is undesirable to permit serving members of the armed forces to stand as candidates for the House of Commons, and since it is also desirable to allow soldiers to have full civil rights, special regulations allowed a soldier who wished to stand for Parliament to leave the army, even if his contract had a number of years to run. Suddenly, dozens of soldiers used the rule as an easy way to break their contracts.
These examples all illustrate the need to restrict `fringe' candidates. This may be done is several ways. They include a requirement that candidates (apart from those representing established political parties) must obtain the signatures of a considerable number of electors in support of their nomination. The advantage of a system of signatures is that it may weed out fringe candidates without penalising candidates who are merely poor and who may thus find it hard to raise a financial deposit. The disadvantage of a signature system is that it is hard to administer and open to abuse. It may not be possible for members of election commissions to check the accuracy of the signatures within the time available for nominations.
The alternative to a barrier of signatures is a system of financial deposits. In Britain, a candidate must submit a deposit of £500 (U.S. $ 800). This is returned if the candidate obtains at least five percent of the votes cast.
The practical effects of a system of financial deposits will depend both on the amount of the deposit and on the threshold a candidate must overcome in order to obtain the return of the deposit.
The American political scientist, Richard Katz, has recently published a study of the effect of the change in the law in Britain in 1985. The new regulations raised the level of the deposit from £150 to £500 but lowered the threshold required for the return of the deposit from 12.5 percent of the votes cast in the constituency to five percent. The results of the change were as follows: (a) under the new system, the main parties in Britain (Conservative, Labour, Liberal Democrat/Social Democrat Alliance and Scottish Nationalists) lost virtually no deposits. (b) Some of the other small parties (such as the Welsh Nationalists and the Greens) lost many deposits but were not deterred from presenting candidates. The rise in the deposit from £150 to £500 was merely regarded by these parties as an added campaign expenditure. The only effect of the higher deposit was to limit the number of independent candidates and those representing fringe or joke parties.13
Deposit levels in a number of country are listed in Katz's book.14 They suggest that it is only in a few countries that the level of deposit of sufficiently high to have a significant effect. As shown by the following list (Table 1), the deposit is a device found especially in countries influenced by the British model of electoral administration.
Table 1
Country
|
Level of Deposit
|
Conditions for return
|
Australia
|
Lower House
|
A$250
|
Four percent of first preference votes
|
|
|
Upper House
|
A$500
|
Membership in group receiving four percent of vote
|
Britain
|
£500
|
Five percent of vote
|
Canada
|
C$200
|
15 percent
|
India
|
R 500
|
One sixth of the vote
|
Ireland
|
I £100
|
One-third of constituency quota
|
Japan
|
¥ 2 million
|
House of Representatives: One-fifth of the valid vote divided by the number of members to be elected
|
Malaysia
|
Ringgit 5,000
|
12.5 percent of votes cast
|
New Zealand
|
NZ$100
|
One quarter of votes of successful candidates
|
13 Richard S. Katz, Democracy and Elections. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997, pp. 255-61.
14 See Table 14.2 in Richard S. Katz, Democracy and Elections. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997.
«« Пред. | ОГЛАВЛЕНИЕ | След. »»
| 
