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8. The Ballot
Under Russian law, the form and text of the presidential ballot is established by the Central Election Commission, although printing of the ballots is the responsibility of the Subject Election Commissions. Territorial Electoral Commissions organize the distribution of ballot to the precincts. Under Article 50 design and approval of the ballot text must be accomplished not later than 28 days before election day. The law allows another 8 days for printing. Precincts are to receive their ballots not later than 4 days prior to the election.
Russian is the official language to be used on all ballots. However, based on a decision made by the Subject Election Commission the ballot can also include text in other languages appropriate to the territory or compact minority language population. If more than one language is necessary, they appear simultaneously on the same ballot paper as the Russian text. The Subject Election Commissions have final approval over the text in these instances.
The ballot must also include an instruction as to how to mark it correctly. Each ballot contains the full names of the candidates listed in alphabetical order. The law appears to offer an option as to the information which must be provided about the candidate on the ballot although the basis of a decision to choose one over the other is unclear. Article 50 indicates that the ballot will include the information provided by «Paragraph 5 of Article 32, or Paragraph 3 of Article 33. Under both of these citations, the last, first and second names, place of work, occupation and place of residence are required under both. However, under Article 32, the date of birth would also have to be included, while this information can be deleted under the provisions of Article 33.
If a candidate has been nominated by an electoral association or bloc, the ballot must contain the name of the electoral association or bloc as well as the candidate's affiliation to a political party or other public association making up the bloc. Candidates nominated by initiative citizens' groups may identify their affiliation if they choose. To the right of each candidate's information is a blank box in which the voter will place the mark indicating his or her choice. At the end of the list of candidates, voters are offered another choice. A voter may also vote, «none of the candidates» by placing a mark in the box printed to the right of this choice.
The number of ballots distributed to each polling site is not to exceed the number of voters whose names appear on the voters' list plus .5%. Each ballot must be «certified» by the Polling Station Committee. The process of certifying the ballot requires that the ballot be stamped with the official seal of the polling site and signed by two members of the Polling Station Election Committee. These markings are to be made in the upper right hand corner of the ballot. Any ballot found in the ballot box without these «certifying» markings are declared invalid and the ballot will not be counted.
Under Article 37, a candidate is entitled to withdraw his or her candidacy at «any time before the day of election.» In the event a candidate withdraws after the ballots have been printed, Polling Station Election Officials are responsible to cross out the candidate's name on the ballots in their charge. Article 50 dictates that this measure is only undertaken under the direction of the Central Election Commission.
For Consideration
10.1. The law does not address the issue of security during transit and storage in the period between the time the ballots are initially printed, during distribution and while they are held by polling sites before election day. The law could provide greater security and safety for the ballots by requiring that the audit trail be initiated at an authorized printing house. The audit trail should be maintained throughout their subsequent transit by various handlers. At each transfer point, quantities should be verified, and recipients should be required to sign a receipt. In addition, provisions should be incorporated to ensure that during transport appropriate security personnel are involved, or at the very least , that more than one member of the relevant election commission be present. Provisions should also require that during the period between delivery to the Polling Station Election Commission and election day, ballots are stored in some type of locked and secured location.
10.2. The only real security measure intended to ensure the accountability of issued ballots is the practice whereby ballots are «certified» by the signatures of PSEC members and the stamp of the polling station. Presumably these markings identify properly issued ballots from those which may have been fraudulently deposited in the ballot box. The law gives no directive as to when this certification is to take place. However, this detail is very important in ensuring that the certification provides the level of security intended. Without clarification in law or through regulations, officials are left to their own devices in determining how this process will be implemented. It is likely that many officials may choose to sign all of their ballots and affix the official stamp in advance, as part of their overall preparations for election day. This certainly appeared to the be case during the presidential elections. The pre-signing and stamping of the ballots virtually eliminates the only security measure the certifying process is intended to provide. It is suggested that for this measure to be meaningful at least part of the required certifying markings be made at the time the ballot is issued. If all certifying markings are affixed to the ballots in advance, every ballot becomes «official,» making it impossible to differentiate between a ballot that was issued properly from one that was placed in the ballot box fraudulently. Even if the signatures were affixed in advance to save time, placing the polling site stamp on the ballot at the time it is issued would not cause any significant delay during the process of voting. This process would, however, help officials determine properly issued ballots from misused ballots. In addition, accountability would be enhanced in that unused ballots would be left «uncertified.»
10.3. As officials look forward to developing improvements in the election process there are enhancements in process of preparing the ballot and in the printing process which should be considered. Ballots should be treated like currency, and more stringent requirements in the printing process could add significantly to overall security and accountability.
. The paper used in ballot printing allows the potential for fraudulent duplication because the law offers no specifications as to the paper or printing and binding techniques that are to be used. One option which would reduce the risk of fraud is to use a quality of paper which includes and exclusive watermark. As an alternative, a faint special ink screen could be applied as background for the text at the same time printing is accomplished. Some printing techniques would allow the security screed to be applied simultaneously with the text during one pass through the press so that the cost would not be significantly increased.
Consideration should be given to ensure that ballots are bound or padded in uniform quantities to provide greater ease in packaging for distribution purposes. Standard packaging and padding of ballots would also provide officials with better control over the ballots under their supervision.
It would be most helpful if ballots were sequentially numbered with a special range of numbers being assigned within each territory. As Subject Election Commissions arrange for numbering system in which the number of the specific territory is printed on each ballot followed by the sequential number within the range assigned to that territory. Handled by territory, the numbering should be easy to accommodate. Sequential numbering of each ballot in a pad would allow Subject and Territorial Commissions to maintain centralized accountability records which document not only the quantity of ballots provided to each polling site, but also the numeric range assigned to each site. The protocols used in accounting for the ballots used throughout the voting day could provide space to identify the sequence numbers of ballots that are issued, individual numbers of the ballots which were damaged or spoiled or otherwise unusable, and the sequences numbers of ballots which remained unused. As an additional measure, the range of sequence numbers issued to each site could be kept secret until actual delivery at which time they could be signed for the by recipients. These kinds of measure could eliminate the need for the certifying of each ballot by having them stamped and signed by officials on election day.
At some point, consideration should be given to printing ballots so that they have a stub or counterfoil from which they can be separated at a perforation. Each time a ballot is issued it could be separated from the stub which would remain attached to the pad. The numbered stubs of issued ballots could remain a part of the formal documentation of activity at each of the polling stations in support of the overall results and accountability for the ballots originally issued to the polling site.
10.4. It would prove helpful if the law included a deadline for withdrawal of the candidates in advance of the printing of ballots. The manner of crossing off candidates' names is cumbersome and time consuming. It also creates a potential for error, and can cause confusion among voters when they receive a ballot that already has markings on it. Article 37 allows the Central Election Commission to impose penalties against candidates who withdraw without compelling circumstances involving a refund of a «respective part of expenditures borne including funds allocated for the pre-election campaign.» However, the current law fails to define «compelling circumstances,» leaving determinations regarding the imposition of these penalties open to subjective interpretation. Establishing a deadline for withdrawal would eliminate most of the problem and would alleviate last minute «deal making» and political maneuverings. It would also go a long way in ensuring that accurate printing of the final ballot could move forward without hindrance. The law could specifically define the kinds of emergency circumstances under which compliance with the deadline could be waived without penalty.
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