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Ïðè ìîíàðõèè ïðàâîñóäèå èñõîäèò îò êîðîëÿ. Ïðè ðåñïóáëèêå îíî äîëæíî èñõîäèòü îò íàðîäà. Âèêòîð Ãþãî (1802-1885), ôðàíöóçñêèé ïèñàòåëü


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22.12.2024, âîñêðåñåíüå. Ìîñêîâñêîå âðåìÿ 05:00


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9. Conduct of the Poll

Polling stations are established by local administrations in coordination with the related Territorial Election Commission. Each polling station may serve up to 3,000 voters. Additionally, stations may be established in special places such as remote sites such as those where military units may be serving, on navigating vessels and in sanatoriums, spas, rest homes, and other places where citizens are located temporarily away from their usual residences. Special stations outside the Russian Federation may also be established in foreign states by the heads of diplomatic missions. Voter lists are compiled for each of these special voting locations by the chiefs of the institutions involved, by the military commander or by the captain of the vessels where voting will take place.

According to Article 49, the voting premises must be equipped with special places or rooms where ballots can be marked in secret. The voting cabins or booths are required to be outfitted with tables and with pens to be used when the ballots are marked. Use of pencil for voting is prohibited under the law.

At each site, officials are to create a space for display of marked copies of sample ballots, presumably for the purposes of instructing voters on how to mark their choices. Under the law, the sample ballots are not to include any candidates' names. This special display area is also supposed to have informational materials on all the candidates and their platforms, although such materials are not allowed to contain «propaganda appeals.»

Before Voting Begins

The regular polling hours are from 8 a.m. to 10 p.m. local time throughout the Russian Federation, although at special voting stations established in institutions, at remote sites and polar stations, in foreign states and on navigating vessels the poll can close earlier if all voters on the voters list have voted. Before the first voter votes, the Polling Station Election Committee is required to display the empty ballot boxes and seal them in full view of the members of the election committee as well as the voters and observers who may be present.

For Consideration

11.1. Ballot boxes are to be displayed and sealed in front of committee member, voters , candidates' representatives and observers before voting begins. The law should clarify that the requirement relates to both the stationary ballot boxes and the mobile ballot The law should also require that both types of ballots boxes remain in full view of committee members and observers at all times throughout the voting day except when the mobile boxes leave the polling station to serve voters voting at home. To greatest extent possible officials should ensure that observers accompany them when the take the mobile ballot boxes to serve voters voting outside the polling station as is allowed under the law. There should never be a ballot box of any kind at a polling station or maintained at the offices or work stations of higher level commissions or that are not in full view of committee members, candidates' representatives, observers and voters who may be present.

11.2. The display and sealing of the ballot boxes is the only task that Article 51 mandates be accomplished immediately prior to the beginning of the actual voting on election day. However, by extrapolating information from a number of seemingly unrelated Articles, there are other tasks that logically occur at some point before the first voter votes. These include verifying the number of ballots received (Article 52) , counting the number of voters on the voter list (Articles 50 and 52) determining how many have applied for a Absentee Certificate (Articles 50 and 52,) and initiating the process of certifying the ballots (Article 50.) The current law suggests that, except for the certification of the ballots, these determinations are made and recorded on the protocol after the close of the polls. However, overall transparency and accountability of the process would be enhanced if an amended law required that these activities be fulfilled in the presence of voters and observers before voting begins on election day.

As part of the pre-poll procedure the number of voters on the main voter list and the number of ballots received by the polling station should be confirmed in front of the committee members, observers, representatives of the candidates and voters who have arrived early. In addition, the number of voters on the list who may have applied and received Absentee Voting Certificates allowing them to vote elsewhere on election day should be counted since their numbers will eventually be excluded from the total number of voters on the lists reported on the protocol according to Paragraph 10, Article 52.

These confirmed calculations should be announced to everyone present. In addition, officials should initiate the ballot accountability protocol by recording these entries before voting begins. These preliminary entries would serve as the base figures against which all subsequent ballot usage and voting activity throughout the day would be balanced. Adjustments in these figures should not be allowed after voting begins. The rest of the entries required on the protocol would still be completed as part of the counting activity after the polls close including the number of voters who presented Absentee Voting Certificates and other voters who were added to the voter list during the course of the day. These voters should be enumerated separately on the protocol so that officials can evaluate if there appear to be an unusually high number which might suggest inadequate preparation of the list or other questionable circumstances needing additional review.

11.3. In order not to delay the opening of the polls past 8:00 a.m. it would be helpful if the law required officials to assemble by at least one hour before voting is to begin to accomplish these pre-poll tasks. Observers and representatives of the candidates, electoral associations and blocs should be allowed to be present during these advance preparations.

11.4. Subsequent Articles related to attachments which accompany the second copies of the protocols suggest that lists of members of the committees with deciding vote are to be prepared (Articles 52, 53 and 54.) These could also be prepared in advance of the voting. Additionally, those Articles mention lists of the «observers of the candidates, electoral associations, electoral blocs, foreign observers and representatives of the mass media who were present at the calculation of votes...» which are to be attached to the second copy of the protocol. It is not clear whether a similar list must be maintained for those present throughout the voting. If such a list is required, it could also be initiated during the pre-poll activities and maintained or updated as necessary throughout the day.

11.5. The Law on Basic Guarantees of Electoral Rights of Citizens provides for advance voting within the 15 days prior to the election by citizens who know they will be away from their precinct on election day. This service is not addressed in the Law on Election of President. The Law on the Election of President should be brought into conformity with the Law on Basic Guarantees on this point. This conformity would alleviate confusion among voters by bringing consistency to the procedures for all elections. It would also ease the confusion for voters and officials alike when federation-wide and local elections are held simultaneously. Since the Law on Basic Guarantees requires this service to be provided in all other types of elections the omission of this service in presidential elections resulted in officials having to devise special procedures to ensure that voters voting in advance only received the local ballot while denying the presidential ballot to the same voters. This variance affected the manner in which notations had to be made in the voter list. Special procedures had to be implemented to accommodate voters who voted in advance in the local election but voted absentee or appeared at the polling site on election day to cast a ballot for president. Misunderstandings about the different services available for the different types of elections may actually have caused some voters to be disenfranchised. In general, if advance voting is to be allowed, the law should address how ballots voted in advance are integrated into election day processing. Typically, preliminary handling of advance ballots takes place in the presence of officials, observers and representatives prior to the beginning of the voting. These steps might include the announcement of the number of voters voting in advance, the comparison of the number of advance ballots (usually maintained in individually sealed envelopes) against the number of signatures of these voters already affixed on the voter list, and placement of these ballots into the ballot box which has already been displayed and sealed.

Processing of Voters

The law is very specific that each voter must vote personally, and that only one voter is allowed in the secrecy booth at a time. Voting on behalf of another person is prohibited. Each voter is required to present a passport or other form of identification in order to vote. Upon verification of the person's identity, the official finds the voters' name on the list. The voter is to check the accuracy of the information and is asked to sign next to his or her name on the list. Under Article 51, with the voter's consent, or if the voter requests it, the official will also write the voter's identification number into the list. Once the ballot is issued the voter proceeds to the secrecy area to mark his or her choice. The voter then deposits the marked ballot into the ballot box personally.

If a voter believes he has made an error on his ballot, the law allows him to return to the official to ask for a new one. The official retains the spoiled ballot and makes a notation next to the voters' name on the voter list that a new ballot was issued. The official «renders» the spoiled ballot void and records a statement about the circumstance. The law does not specify the disposition of the spoiled ballots, however, it is presumed that they are segregated and maintained for accountability purposes until they are reported with other canceled ballots on the protocol prepared at the end of the count.

If a voter appears at the polling site and presents a Absentee Certificate indicating that he is not able to go to his regular polling station, officials add his name to the additional voter list for the station where the voter will vote instead. The voter is allowed to vote in the usual manner.

For Consideration

11.6. The law is not clear as to the role of members of Polling Station Election Committees with deliberative vote during the poll on election day. In certain instances the law poses specific restrictions on their activities or limits participation in an activity only to those members with deciding vote. For example, Article 51 dictates that the entry of the voter's ID number onto the voter list may only be accomplished by a member with deciding vote. By being specific about those tasks which may only be accomplished by members with deciding vote it is implied that members with deliberative vote may participate in other activities not so identified. It would be helpful if the law could provide further clarification as to which activities and responsibilities may be undertaken by members with deciding vote and which may be engaged in by members with deliberative vote. For example, may either type of member certify a ballot by affixing his or her signature? May either type of member inspect a voter's identification, locate the voter's name on the voter list and issue ballots? To avoid any potential misunderstandings it would be helpful if the law was clear on the specific roles of the various types of members and what they may and may not do.

11.7. The law does not provide adequate details as to processing voters from other precincts who present an Absentee Certificate. For example, the law does not specify that these voters must also sign the additional list. Nor does the law dictate the disposition of the Certificate. Is it retained by the Polling Station Election Committee as part of its overall supporting documentation of election day activity, or is it retained by the voter? The law should clarify that the commission retain the certificate to preclude it from being used improperly.

(In the general election, CEC instructions indicated that the certificate would be stamped by the commission where the person voted, but that the actual document would be retained by voter so that he could use it in the second round. During the repeat voting, the certificate was kept by the election commission where the person voted. It is understandable that officials may have considered the convenience to the voter to allow the person to keep the certificate after voting in the first round. It is recommended that the law require the document to be retained by the commission issuing the ballot as part of the official record of election day activity. If the voter will be away from his station during both the general election and repeat voting, perhaps two separate certificates could be issued, each clearly marked with the type of election in which it is intended to be used. They could even be printed on different colored paper to make it easy for polling site officials to recognize the election for which it is intended)

11.8. The law allows the voter to present a passport or «an identity card substituting for it» at the time the ballot is issued. The law should describe the other types of identification which will be accepted. If only specific types of documents will be acceptable, they should be itemized. At the very least, the law should specify the kind of information which must be included in the identifying document for it to be accepted. In some contexts, officials send voters a «invitation» to vote which lets voters know where and when the voting will take place, as well as their number in the voter lists. If these types of documents are used in the Russian Federation, the law should specify that they would not be sufficient identification for voting purposes since there can be no assurances that they would always be presented by the person to whom they rightfully belong.

11.9. Although the law makes no reference to such procedures, in the second round of voting commissions in some areas sent an «invitation to vote» to voters in their jurisdictions. Many voters who had received them brought these invitations with them when they came to the polls. If this practice is to be implemented on a consistent basis, the law should address the issue. In particular, the law should preclude acceptance of these invitations in lieu of other identification.

11.10. Article 14 of the law specifies that at remote sites such as those established for polar stations and for military units and on vessels and in foreign states, the chiefs, commanders or diplomatic officials will facilitate the voting in place of traditionally appointed Polling Station Election Commissions. Considering the unusual and inaccessible circumstances under which these stations will work it is likely that some of the regular procedures established for voting at normal stations may not be feasible or practical. However, the law neither specifies that the procedures at these stations will be exactly the same as those for all other stations; nor does it provide any allowances or restrictions on alternative procedures that may be implemented to meet the unusual circumstances. For example, the law dictates that the procedures used in accommodating voters who must vote outside the polling station on election day may not infringe on the voters' right to vote in secret. This kind of wording should be added to provisions related to voting stations at remote or inaccessible locations. These kinds of considerations are particularly important in military installations where military personnel may feel real or perceived pressure from their superiors who are also responsible for conduct of the polling. If allowances for alternative procedures are necessary to accommodate special conditions, the law should at the very least dictate those provisions which may not be waived under any circumstance. The law should also address the issue of the general rights of candidates to appoint their members of deliberative vote to polling stations. Since it is unlikely that conditions would exist at some of these locations to make such representation feasible the law should be modified to address limitations of these rights under certain extreme conditions.

Special Voter Services

Voting in Remote Sites and Early Voting

Russian lawmakers and election authorities have made a determined effort to permit Russian citizens living or traveling abroad or temporarily working at remote sites or on military and commercial vessels to vote. A significant number of these voters (approximately 5% of the entire number of voters who participated in the election) took advantages of special services afforded them by the law.

Voters residing or traveling abroad had access to voting through the many polling sites established at embassies and consular offices throughout the world. IFES was able to observe the voting at the embassies in Washington D.C. and in Kiev. In Washington, D.C. there were 589 voters on the voter list convening embassy and consulate employees as well as employees of enterprises such as Aeroflot. Ultimately, however, with additions to the list, the number of ballots cast at the Washington Embassy was approximately 1,500 during each round of voting. At the Russian Embassy in Kiev, there were over 1,000 voters on the list including those that were added during the course of the voting.

In addition to the Washington D.C. sites, polling stations were also established in a number of cities across the country including, for example, Chicago, New York, Boston, Philadelphia, Seattle, Los Angeles and San Francisco. In general, procedures followed by the polling officials serving the embassies were consistent with those implemented at polling stations within the Russian Federation. All the poll workers at the sites observed by IFES seemed to be embassy and consulate employees. According to the Deputy Chairman of the Commission in Washington, all of the commission members and poll workers received materials produced by the CEC, including copies of the Constitution, Law on the Election of the President, CEC regulations and the handbook for polling station workers. All of these were available on site at the Washington, D.C. polling station throughout the polling hours and during the count.

At the overseas sites observed by IFES, voters were consistently asked to present their identification before being allowed to vote. In Kiev the number of voters appearing to vote absentee without Absentee Certificates exceeded those who had them. However, based on their valid identification, there were added to the list and allowed to vote. In Washington, D. C., however, IFES team members noted that voters who were not on the voter list and who did not have Absentee Certificates were asked to fill out a special request form to be added to the list. In Kiev, during the time IFES members were present, six voters were refused ballots who did not have appropriate citizenship documents with them. One of the voters submitted a handwritten complaint that the Chairman advised would be forwarded to the Central Election Commission in Moscow.

At the embassy in Washington no use was made of the mobile ballot box during the first round of voting. However, during the second round request for this service was received. An embassy car was used to take the mobile ballot box to the voters. IFES team members noted that the voter list was removed from the polling station and accompanied the mobile ballot box. Voters voting through the mobile ballot were asked to sign the same list that had been used by voters voting inside the polling station. It is not clear how voters who arrived at the polling site during the time the voter list was away from the station were processed or where they signed for their ballots. In Kiev only one request was responded to although there were others received but it was determined that the voters were too far away to be served.

In Kiev there were observers present who represented Zyuganof or the Communist Party. The indicated that they were generally satisfied that the process appeared to be in order. In Washington the IFES team seemed to be the only observers on hand with the exception of representatives from CNN. There appeared to be conflicting reports from officials serving in the Washington polling station as to whether Yeltsin observers were present at either of the elections. None were encountered at either election during the IFES team's presence.

Article 51 provides that Subject Election Committees may permit early voting within the 15 days prior to the date set for the election at voting. Under this provision permission for early voting may be given to vessels of the commercial, fishing scientific research navy and river fleets which will be on expeditions, autonomous navigation or at foreign ports on the day of the election. In addition, early voting may be allowed at polar stations and «other remote regions» or where access is difficult.

It appears that the non-specific language pertaining to «other remote regions» may also have been used as the legal basis to cover early voting at some locations in foreign states. For example, the voting station established in Washington, D.C. was not only responsible for the counting and reporting of votes cast at their own site. Other sites were established in Cleveland, Philadelphia, Miami, Houston and the Washington, D.C. Dacha in Mary. However, they were apparently not established as «polling stations.» Rather, these sites were subordinated to the polling station at the Embassy in Washington where the Polling Station Election Commission was, at least in the first round, ultimately responsible for counting their ballots. Although the results from each site were counted separately and a working copy of a protocol was made for each of these locations, ultimately the results from all of locations were commingled and reported on a single protocol. Based on the summarized report of the vote count, approximately 2,195 voters participated at the Washington polling station and its subordinate sites. In order for the results at these other sites to be integrated into the federation-wide totals, voting had to be accomplished early so that their ballot boxes could be delivered to the Washington, D.C. Embassy voting station by election day to be counted at the close of the polls. During the second round, however, the counting process for some of these sites was altered. For instance in Cleveland, Miami and Philadelphia the ballots were counted on site. Their resulting protocols were then faxed to Washington. A summary of the results from the subordinate sites was summed up on one protocol in pencil. They summarized results were then commingled with the Washington results on a final protocol written in ink that was then faxed directly to Moscow.

The law is silent with regard to any accommodation for the creation and organization of subsidiary voting sites which are not fully recognized as polling stations. Nor does the law address procedures which are to be implemented to ensure that voting at these sites is transparent and accountable. Since these subsidiary sites were not fully accredited polling stations and no individual protocols were generated for them, their activity cannot be tracked by normal avenues. In the absence of any legal foundation for their existence their organization and operation circumvented many of the rules including those governing the appointments, rights and responsibilities of polling station commissions; nor were they specifically covered by provisions allowing for deliberative voting members or accredited observers eliminating the transparency safeguards instituted for election day activity at polling stations.

The law is sparse in its direction regarding early voting. There is a need to refine the law to clarify procedures for the conduct and accountability of the election process under these unique conditions. In particular, attention needs to be focussed on safeguarding the secrecy of the vote and the transparency and accountability of activity in these circumstances. It is recommended that the law require that the results at each of these sites be reported on their own separate protocols and that each site be responsible for accounting for the voters participating at their locations and all ballots distributed to them.

For Consideration

11.11. Due to the uncertainty in the number of voters who would present themselves at the embassies on election day, IFES noted that far more ballots had been sent than were actually needed. Kiev received 2,000 ballots while the embassy in Washington, D.C. had received 5,000 ballots. According to officials serving at the Washington site the voter turnout for the presidential elections was only slightly higher than for the Duma elections in December of 1995. It is recommended that the actual turnout figures experienced in prior elections be used for a basis for determining how many ballots should be sent to sites outside the boundaries of the Russian Federation.

In contrast to the overage of ballots provided to Washington, many subordinate cities experienced a shortage. When some of these cities had run out of ballots, the embassy faxed ballots to them. The faxed ballots contained only one commission member's signature and no official stamp. When the ballots from these sites were returned for inclusion in the count, the faxed ballots contained no additional certifications of authenticity from the polling site where they were actually issued. IFES team members noted that the faxed ballots did contain the embassy fax number, however, there was no way to ascertain whether a record had been kept of the number of ballots that had been faxed.

11.12. The law provides that Subject Election Commissions may allow remote and inaccessible sites and navigation vessels to implement early voting in the 15 day period before election day. However, the law provides no guidance as to how the process is to be carried out. Among the questions which would be answered in the law are:

a. by whom, how and when counting of these votes is to take place;

b. how and when reporting of results is to be accomplished;

c. when may results from these sites be made available;

d. how results from these special cites will be transmitted and integrated into consolidated results and at what commission level (Territory? Subject? Central Election Commission?)

11.13. Consideration should be given to expanding the provisions of law related to voting in foreign states, and preferably to allow for the creation of fully appointed polling stations at sites other than Embassies. Issues to be resolved are similar to those in need of clarification for early voting on navigating vessels and remote sites. It is recommended that individual locations be treated as fully established polling stations, even if they report their results to a central location such as an Embassy station. As a practical matter, Commissions at Embassy offices could be established as a «remote» Territorial Commission for the purposes of providing technical support and guidance to these stations, and for accumulating their individual protocols and reporting of aggregate totals for the all the overseas stations in the country where the Embassy is located.

11.14. The Law on the Election of President makes no other provisions for early voting for the general population of voters. This omission is at odds with Article 30 on the Law on Basic Guarantees of Electoral Rights of Citizens which dictates that early voting is available to any voters who will be absent from their permanent residences within the 15 days prior to voting day. Not only is early voting allowed in local elections, it is also allowed in election of deputies to the State Duma. This variance is another example of a conflict between the law governing a specific type of election, and the foundation law outlining fundamental guarantees. These laws should be brought into conformity on this point to ensure consistency and to alleviate the potential misunderstandings that could result in voters being disenfranchised.

11.15. If it is intended that laws guiding specific types of elections may waive rights and services afforded in the Law on Basic Guarantees, that law should clarify the conditions under which a waiver is permissible. If opportunities for advance voting are mandatory, the Law on the Election of President law should dictate the manner in which advance ballots will be maintained and accounted for before election day, how safeguards will be imposed to eliminate opportunities for voters to vote in advance and again on election day, how the secrecy of ballots of the advance voters will be preserved, and how advance ballots will ultimately be integrated into regular counting and reporting activities and the kind of record keeping and documentation which will be necessary.

Voters Who Need Assistance

The law provides that voters who are unable to sign the voter list or to mark their ballots without assistance may receive help from any other person except a member of the Polling Station Election Committee, an observer or representative of a candidate. The person who assists the voter who cannot sign the voter list, indicates his or her name and signs the voter list in a column where the voter would normally sign acknowledging receipt of the ballot. When a voter needs help in marking the ballot, the assisting person indicates his name on the voter list next to the signature of the voter.

Voting Outside the Polling Station

Article 51 provides an avenue for participation by voters who because of ill health or other good reason are not able to appear at the polling station on election day. According to the law, Polling Station Election Committees are required to make arrangements to deliver the ballots to these voters and to use mobile ballot boxes for this purpose. Observers are allowed to accompany the officials as they accommodate these voters. When ballots are delivered the voter is to confirm his or her application to vote away from the voting premises in writing. Upon receipt of the ballot, the voter is to mark his or her application and sign it. The application is required to contain the same information about the voter as appears on the voter list.

The law provides a number of safeguards to ensure some accountability by requiring officials who will be accompanying the mobile ballots boxes to sign a receipt for the ballots in an amount corresponding to the number of applications. According to the instructions provided in the Flip-Chart for Members of Polling site election commissions prepared by the Central Election Commission, however, officials were authorized to take extra ballots with the justification that they might be needed if a voter spoiled his ballot and needed a replacement. Upon return to the polling station, the officials complete a separate statement recording the number of applications and the number of ballots which were used as well as those that remain unused. For each voter who voted outside the polling station, a notation is made to that effect next to their names in the voter list. The mobile ballot boxes containing the ballots cast by voters outside the polling station must remain sealed until after the polls close and counting begins.

For Consideration

Although an attempt is made to promote accountability of this process, the law does not provide sufficient safeguards against abuses of the system. The law implies that these voters «apply» for this service, however, in actuality the application is completed or «confirmed» only upon delivery of the ballots. The law offers no guidance as to how officials are to be informed about voters who are to be visited. That means that there is no assurance that this service is provided only to those voters who have actually applied.

In practice, it is assumed that the commissions will accept requests over the phone, or from voters appearing on election day who make a request on behalf of a family member or friend. However, IFES learned that in some instances the mobile ballot box is used for a much broader purpose. For example, it appears that mobile ballot boxes are sometimes used to serve groups of voters such as military personnel who are assigned to a civilian polling station or for those at a health facility at which no separate polling station has been established. IFES was advised that sometimes in lieu of bringing people to the station, the mobile ballot box is taken to the voters instead. The application forms are simply taken and completed on the spot when ballots and mobile boxes are brought to the location with no prior request being made by the individuals themselves.

Although during the 1996 presidential elections the system seemed to have been generally handled in compliance with the law's intent, the vagueness of the law regarding the method of application leaves the system vulnerable to misuse. In effect, officials are free to take ballots to any person on the voter list who has not appeared at the polls. In fact, at a few precincts visited by IFES during the presidential elections, officials acknowledged that they would review the voter list and determine who had not voted. Their intent was to send officials to visit these voters to encourage them to vote. They assured IFES observers that they would not take mobile ballot boxes with them during this solicitation effort, but it could provide opportunities to artificially promote absentee «applications» even if it meant a return trip to deliver ballots at a later time. Whether out of concern that the threshold of turnout is not being met, or to solicit votes from selected persons believed to have specific political leanings, the opportunities for unwarranted use of the procedure could go unchecked.

It also became evident that there was no consistency as to how applications were being documented. On election day, it was obvious that commission members had information about voters who wanted ballots delivered to them on scraps of paper, the backs of envelopes, and as notes in the margins of unrelated documents. As voters telephoned their requests it was apparent that commission members simply wrote the information on anything that was handy. During the course of voting on election day members of commissions appeared to be transferring the information to individual application forms.

11.16. Consideration should be given to amending the law to provide clearer limitations as to the circumstances which would make someone eligible to vote outside the polling site. The law currently allows this service to people on the basis of health, «or other good reason.» Although in practice ballots are generally delivered to people at their homes, the law certainly does not specifically restrict voters to having ballots delivered to them at their residences. If the mobile ballot box is to continue to be used for more general purposes or as a substitute for establishment of separate polling sites, the law should identify the special circumstances under which this type of special used is authorized. For serving groups of voters at special institutions or facilities, there should at least be a requirement that the commanding officer or chief of such an installation be required to submit a letter or other document in advance identifying the voters who will be served. The purpose of setting some restrictions is generally to limit or control the number of votes which are cast outside the control of the committee as a whole, and outside the general view of the majority of observers and representatives of the candidates. Any time ballots are removed from the polling site the door is opened for potential abuses and, just as importantly, to allegations of impropriety, even if no such circumstance really exists.

11.17. Consideration should also be given to establishing a deadline by which applications must be made, even if the deadline is at a specific hour on election day. Such a deadline would allow officials to know at what time they could schedule their departure to facilitate this process. This would allow the appropriate notations to be made in the voter list before officials leave the polling station. This would also allow the actual number of voters to be served and the number of ballots needed for this purpose to be known in advance of the official's departure with the mobile ballot box, to the benefit of candidate representatives and observers, improving transparency and minimizing opportunities for abuse. The law should require that this number of applications and ballots being taken from the polling site be announced out loud for the benefit of candidates' observers prior to the officials' departure.

11.18. The law is specific that the number of ballots taken from the polling site should equal the number of applications. The instruction which allows officials to take extra ballots in case a voter makes a mistake or spoils his, regardless of how well motivated, encourages officials to ignore a legal requirement. The law should be amended if the policy is to have a legal foundation. Should lawmakers not concede to the practicality of such an amendment, officials should be required to adhere to the requirement that only a number of ballots equal to the number of applications be taken from the polling site. The law should also specify that only those applications which have been requested prior to the deadline may be taken with the ballots and the mobile ballot. These amendments would not interfere with the current requirement that unused ballots be accounted for and that at home voting activity be reported on a separate statement. It would be important that the deadline be publicized so that voters understand that a deadline is in effect. As applications are taken over the phone or made in person the real application form should be used. The law should be enhanced to require that an «application» form require inclusion of the information about the voter being served, and the date, time and signature of the official who took the information over the phone or the signature of a person who applies in person on behalf of a family member or friend.

11.19. It would also be helpful if the law dictated that officials work in pairs to accommodate this service and that both officials and any observer who accompanies them sign the applications.

11.20. It is recommended that the law be amended to require that the statement on which officials attest to the number of ballots they received, the number they are returning unused, and the number of applications also include the name and authorizing organization of any observer who accompanied them as they facilitated voting outside the polling place. These observers should be allowed to sign as a witness to the activity. By their signature they would be attesting that the process was carried out properly. These acknowledgments are useful in avoiding opportunities for subsequent challenges or allegations of impropriety.

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